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Introduction 
Awell-functioning housing finance system will benefit the economythrough prosperous real estate development, construction sectoremployment, more efficient resource allocation, and lower macro-
economic volatility. (1) In particular, as mortgages are essential to enhance
buyers’ purchasing power and expedite the path to homeownership, many
countries have committed to financial innovations creating robust mort-
gage markets in the past decades. However, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
around 2008 showed that while innovative financial products can help
households achieve the dream of homeownership, they might have adverse
effects on the housing and financial sectors and even on the overall econ-
omy.  
China is transitioning from a socialist central planned economy to a mar-
ket economy, and both its financial and housing development are still in
their early stages. This makes the development of the housing finance sys-
tem more fundamental and more challenging than in market economies.
Along with the flourishing housing development that began in the 1990s,
the residential mortgage sector grew rapidly in the 2000s, becoming a fi-
nancial engine for the housing boom. (2) In September 2014, the Chinese
government proposed developing a secondary mortgage market with mort-
gage-backed securitisation (MBS) (3) to ease the capital shortage problem
in the banking system and to reverse the housing downturn that began at
the end of 2013. As the global economy remains in the shadow of the GFC
triggered by problems in the subprime mortgage markets in the United
States, many scholars doubt this strategy and pose several questions: Will
MBS development lead to a similar economic crisis in China? Is China ready
for the development of a secondary mortgage market under its existing in-
stitutions, norms, and regulations? And how is the role of housing justified
in the overall socio-economic development? 
Updated studies on the Chinese mortgage system, particularly on the sec-
ondary market, remain a neglected aspect in the growing English literature
on Chinese housing research. This paper tries to fill this gap through a com-
parative analysis of the current Chinese mortgage market with the markets
before or in the early stage of GFC in some advanced economies that had
seen the most prosperous development of the mortgage market but suf-
fered most from the GFC. The purpose of the study is to inform market par-
ticipants and policy-makers in China about the range of mortgage product
offerings available in other countries, and to explore the potential and rigidi-
ties of development of the secondary mortgage market in China at present
state. 
The development of housing finance in
China 
The restructuring of the housing finance system 
The housing finance system before the 1980s was simple. Under the cen-
tral planning regime, the private housing market and residential mortgage
lending were absent. Housing was treated as a social welfare product funded
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and delivered by the government and its agencies (e.g., state-owned enter-
prises and housing bureaus). This institutional design put huge financial bur-
dens on the government and led to insufficient housing provision
nationwide. The average living space per capita decreased from 4.5 m2 in
1952 to 3.6 m2 in 1978, much lower than that in many other countries, e.g.,
18 m2 in the United States, 15 m2 in Singapore, 13 m2 in Japan, and 13 m2
in the Soviet Union around 1978. (4)
The economic reforms that began in 1978 restructured the housing sys-
tem by privatising existing welfare housing and introducing a private hous-
ing market. The government adopted a variety of strategies to expand
funding sources for housing to reduce dependence on the government for
housing development. Housing savings banks and the Housing Provident
Fund (HPF) were the major innovations in the 1980s and early 1990s.
In October 1987, the first housing savings bank, Yantai Housing Savings
Bank, was established in Shandong Province. It was an independent institu-
tion established by the local government and several other institutions to
provide loan services for developers, investors, builders, and buyers. In May
1988, a second housing savings bank (Bengbu Housing Savings Bank) was
established in Anhui Province with a similar function to the Yantai Housing
Savings Bank. Loans were provided to account holders at discounted interest
rates, and mortgages had a maximum loan-to-value rate of 70% and ma-
turities of five, ten, and 15 years. (5) However, largely due to the lack of policy
support and the prevalence of the HPF, the Bengbu Housing Savings Bank
was merged into another bank in 2001 and the Yantai Housing Savings Bank
was converted into a normal commercial bank in 2003. In 2004, a third
housing savings bank, the Sino-German Bausparkasse Co. Ltd., was set up
in Tianjin by China Construction Bank and Bausparkasse Schwaebisch Hall
AG with a shareholding of 75.1% and 24.9% respectively. By 2013 this bank
had provided housing-related products to nearly 110, 000 households with
a total contract amount of over 40 trillion yuan. (6)
Modelled on the Central Provident Fund in Singapore, China’s HPF debuted
as an experiment in Shanghai in 1991 and became an official national strat-
egy in 1995. The HPF is a program in which both employers and employees
of public and private enterprises are required to contribute a certain percent-
age of the employees’ salaries, normally 5%, to employees’ HPF accounts
with the China Construction Bank. Employees can use the HPF to purchase
homes in the private market or for housing repairs and construction. A spe-
cialised entity under the supervision of the municipal government, the Hous-
ing Provident Fund Management Centre, is responsible for managing the HPF. 
The mortgage market did not play an important role until the mid-1990s.
As most housing purchases before the mid-1990s resulted from the sale of
welfare housing to sitting tenants by their employers (state-owned enter-
prises) at low prices, there was generally little need for a mortgage. Mean-
while, the state-owned banks were not comfortable with providing loans
to individuals and often imposed harsh restrictions on loan originations.
Loans prior to the 1990s were available only to those who had bank savings
equal to 30% of the home’s value, with loan maturity of up to five years. (7)
In 1997, mortgage loans represented only 12.7% of total real estate loans. (8)
Most real estate loans went to the supply side to finance the construction
of new buildings, partially contributing to the oversupply of commercial
housing, the bankruptcy of many development companies, and the demo-
lition of properties in some regions in the early- and mid-1990s.
The turning point came with the termination of welfare housing provision
in 1998. The central bank set up basic mortgage lending standards to sup-
port housing purchases by households in the private market. Banks wel-
comed residential mortgage lending, since the default rate for individual
mortgage loans was generally lower than for state-owned enterprises. (9)
The establishment of lending standards and the changing attitude of banks,
coupled with strong housing demand following the termination of welfare
housing, led to unprecedented growth in the housing and mortgage markets
in subsequent years. The ratio of real estate investment to GDP increased
from 4.28% in 1998 to 15.12% in 2013, and national housing price in-
creased from 2,063 yuan/m2 in 1998 to 6,237 yuan/m2 in 2013. The number
of enterprises engaged in the real estate sector increased from 24,378 in
1998 to 91,444 in 2013. The per capita floor area in the urban areas in-
creased from 8.8 m2 in 1998 to 32.9 m2 in 2012. The balance of mortgage
loans amounted to 11.12 trillion yuan as of September 2014, up from 42.62
billion yuan in 1998. (10)
It is notable that administrative measures and monetary policies have
been among the most critical deterrents to housing and mortgage devel-
opment in the past two decades. For example, the government set housing
as the pillar industry to sustain economic growth around the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis. As a result, mortgage loans recorded a year-on-year increase
of 87.8% in 1999. (11) The central bank adjusted the interest rates four times
and the deposit reserve ratio twice in the fourth quarter of 2008 to prop
up the housing downturn caused by the GFC. In 2011, the central govern-
ment put restrictive administrative policies on housing purchases and mort-
gage borrowings to cool the overheated housing market (e.g., some citizens
are not allowed to purchase housing units or apply for mortgages). Legis-
lated as the sole owner of urban land by the Constitution, the government
serves as the supplier of urban land and played a market role in the housing
market.
The mortgage market in China
The primary market
Housing financial institutions: Two kinds of housing finance institutions
operate in China, including general finance institutions and specialist hous-
ing finance institutions (see Figure 1). The former plays a much bigger role
than the latter in the mortgage market. In particular, the five state-owned
commercial banks dominate the mortgage market, as evident from their
high market shares in Table 1. These five banks, previously state-owned,
listed on the stock exchange in the 2000s and became responsible for their
business operations under the strict supervision of the central bank. In ad-
dition, there were 12 joint-equity commercial banks, 116 city commercial
banks, 48 foreign commercial banks and hundreds of rural financial institu-
tions as of December 2014. (12)
52 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 5 / 4
4. Zhang Xianqiao, “Taolun chengshi zhuzhai wenti” (Discussing the Issue of Urban Residential Hous-
ing), Tianjin Social Science, Vol. 6, 1984, pp. 23-28. 
5. Gao Shangquan and Chu Chuanheng (eds), “Zhongguo chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige quanshu” (Com-
plete Collection on Housing System Reform in Chinese Cities and Towns), Beijing, China Jihua Press, 1996. 
6. China Construction Bank, “Sino-German Bausparkasse Co. Ltd.,” (Zhongde zhufang chuxu yinhang
youxian zeren gongsi), 2014, www.ccb.com/cn/public/20100126_1264493340.html (accessed
on 30 December 2014). 
7. Zhang Xinquan, “The Restructuring of the Housing Finance System in Urban China,” Cities, Vol.
17, No. 5, 2000, pp. 339-348.
8. China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, China Statistical Press, 1998.
9. Deng Yongheng and Fei Peng, “The Emerging Mortgage Markets in China,” art. cit.
10. China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, China Statistical Press, 2014.
11. China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, China Statistical Press, 2000.
12. China Banking Regulatory Commission, “The Structure of Financial Institutions in China,” 2014,
www.cbrc.gov.cn/showyjhjjindex.do (accessed on 30 December 2014).
Article
Housing financial instruments: Mortgages in the primary market include
commercial individual loans and HPF loans. As the HPF loans have amount
ceilings and in many cases are not enough to complete transactions due to
high housing prices, hybrid mortgages that combine the maximum amount
of HPF and commercial mortgages were introduced. Commercial mortgage
loans have dominated the mortgage market. The balance of HPF loans was
19.22% of the total balance of commercial mortgage loans as of December
2014. (13)
Interest rate and maturity: All residential mortgages in China are ad-
justable rate mortgages, following the baseline set by the central bank. Once
the central bank announces a rate adjustment, it is applied to all existing
mortgage loans with maturity greater than one year starting from the be-
ginning of the following year. Since 2005, commercial banks have been al-
lowed to adjust the mortgage rates for their business operations. As of
December 2014, the market shares of domestic bank loans with interest
rates at lower, flat, and over the baseline were 13.10%, 19.64% and 67.26%
respectively. (14) The HPF interest rate is much lower than that of commercial
mortgages. The over-five-year interest rates for commercial mortgage loans
and HPF were 6.55% and 4.50% respectively as of December 2013. (15) The
minimum down payment is set by the central bank at 20%, the maximum
mortgage maturity is 30 years, and the applicant’s age plus mortgage length
should not exceed 65 years.
Default rate: The default rate in China is relatively low (see Table 1). Most
default cases in the real estate sector are related to presale properties where
the developers failed to deliver housing units on time or to meet the con-
ditions in the contracts. The low default rate is largely the result of bank
due diligence procedures that carefully ascertain the applicants’ income,
occupation, and asset status, etc. Applicants must provide documents in-
cluding tax returns, bank statements, and proof of other assets, e.g., vehicle
ownership, stock investments, and ownership of other properties. Banks may
require additional guarantees and commercial insurance. The bank head-
quarters actively monitor the delinquency rates in their mortgage portfolios
from time to time. (16)
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Note: The state-owned commercial banks include the Industry and Business Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the Construction Bank of China,
and the Transportation Bank of China. The 12 joint-equity commercial banks include CITIC Industrial Bank, China Everbright Bank, Hua Xia Bank, China Minsheng Banking Corpo-
ration, China Merchant Bank, Industrial Bank Co., Ltd, Guangdong Development Bank, Ping An Bank Co., Ltd, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Evergrowing Bank Co. Ltd,
China Zheshang Bank Co. Ltd, Bohai Bank.
Source: compiled by the author. Data source: China Banking Regulatory Commission, “The Structure of Financial Institutions in China,” 2014, www.cbrc.gov.cn/showyjhjjindex.do
(accessed on 30 December 2014). 
Prepayment penalty: The prepayment penalty compensates the lender for
reinvestment risk and for the cost of processing the prepayment. Despite
the popularity of prepayment, there is no penalty on prepayment in China.
While changes in household income and interest rates for deposits are the
determinants driving mortgage prepayments, the most sensitive factor
could be fluctuations in mortgage interest rates. Moreover, as individuals in
China have limited alternative investment opportunities, many applicants
choose to pay off mortgages in a depressed stock market. 
Funding sources: Through the restructuring of the housing finance system,
the government has withdrawn from the budgetary funding mechanism for
housing provision, and general financial institutions have become the main
funding providers for housing purchases by individuals. Table 2 shows that
deposits were the major funding source of loans for general financial insti-
tutions in 2013. 
The secondary market 
With the rapid growth of residential mortgages in China, the commercial
banks are eager to improve the liquidity of mortgage loans. However, they
have limited alternatives to liquidate their mortgage products in the capital
market. The central bank set up a pilot for MBS in 2005, under which China
Construction Bank was authorised to issue a MBS deal of 3.0 billion yuan in
the domestic interbank bond market. China Construction Bank issued an-
other MBS deal of 4.0 billion yuan in 2007. However, MBS development
was halted largely due to the GFC triggered by problems with MBS in the
United States. It was not until July 2014 that the Postal Savings Bank of
China announced the third MBS of 6.8 billion yuan. In September 2014, the
central bank released a policy document encouraging banking organisations
to commit to the development of MBS and other financial bonds with long-
term maturities to raise capital exclusively for mortgages, particularly for
first-home buyers of self-occupied premises. 
The resumption of MBS was largely due to the downturn in the housing
market that began in late 2013. The amount of floor space and total sales
of commercial buildings sold between January and September 2014 both
declined from those in 2013 by 8.6% and 8.9%, respectively. (17) Several
factors contributed to this market downturn, including large-scale hous-
ing inventory in some cities, the ongoing massive social housing pro-
gramme, the expected property tax levy, the recent anti-corruption
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Bank Types Total Assets Total Loan Balance Non-Performing Loans to Total
Commercial Banks 66,879.2 427.2 1.12
Joint-equity Commercial Banks 29,710.6 152.7 1.09
City Commercial Banks 17,099.9 78.6 1.11
Rural Financial Institutions 21,488.6 100.2 1.86
Foreign Banks 2,580.5 81.0 0.69
Table 1 – Market share of housing finance institutions in China, Q3 2014 (billion yuan, %)
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission, “Market share of housing finance institutions in China, Q3 2014,” 2014, www.cbrc.gov.cn/showyjhjjindex.do
(accessed on 30 December 2014).
2013 (billion yuan) Percentage
Total 117,466.6 100
1) Total Deposits 104,384.7 88.86
Corporate deposits 52,082.6 49.89
Personal deposits 46,650.2 44.70
Fiscal deposits 3,013.3 2.89
Temporary deposits 166.1 0.16
Designated deposits 35.4 0.03
Other deposits 2,437.0 2.33
2) Financial Bond 668.1 0.57
3) Currency in Circulation 5,857.4 5.00
4) Liabilities to International Financial Institutions 85.4 0.07
5) Others 6,470.9 5.51
Table 2 – Balance sheet of credit funds of financial institutions in China 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, China Statistical Press, 2014.
campaign, and most significantly, the capital shortage in the real estate
sector. The rise of Internet finance and the flourishing of the shadow
banking system around 2013 have greatly reduced the capital of com-
mercial banks. The balances of deposits declined quarter-to-quarter and
month-to-month in the first quarter of 2014 (see Table 3). Four out of
the five state-owned commercial banks recorded lower year-on-year
profit growth rates in 2013 (see Table 4). With reduced capital and the
slowdown in profit growth, the commercial banks strategically controlled
capital flow to the real estate sector. Particularly, banks showed less in-
terest in individual mortgage loans, which were generally safe but of low
profit due to their long maturity and relatively low interest rates com-
pared with short-term loans to small and medium private enterprises.
Many banks initiated strict rules on mortgage applications and increased
mortgage interest rates by 5%-15% and down payments from 60% to
70% for second housing unit purchases. Consequently, the growth rates
in real estate loans recorded a year-on-year decrease of 0.3% in the first
quarter of 2014 (see Table 3). The growth of developers’ capital in hand
slowed considerably from 28.7% in September 2013 to 2.3% in Septem-
ber 2014. While bank loans were reduced, developers, most with high li-
ability-to-asset ratios of around 75%, (18) dropped housing prices for
faster capital return. 
Overall, a mortgage market has been gradually taking shape since the
1990s to match the prosperous housing development. The mortgage market
has grown rapidly, and individual mortgages represented 61.64% of the
total real estate loans in 2013, upon from 13.72% in 1998 (see Table 5),
implying the shift in focus of housing finance from the supply sector in the
1990s to the consumption side in the 2000s. The mortgage market is dom-
inated by the five state-owned commercial banks with adjustable interest
rates set by the central bank. The fund sources for mortgages are very lim-
ited, and a secondary market has not emerged in China. As a result of the
legacy of socialist central planning, government involvement in the mort-
gage market is particularly strong, and there are strong ties between the
central government and the central bank, and between the central bank
and the commercial banks. 
Comparing the Mortgage Markets
Diversity in mortgage markets
While the residential mortgage market in China is still in its early stage,
advanced economies generally had relatively large mortgage markets before
or around the GFC, with a variety of configurations in the market share of
adjustable- versus fixed-rate mortgages, and choices of prepayment penal-
ties, mortgage maturity, funding mechanisms (deposits versus capital mar-
kets), etc. 
Mortgage interest rates and maturity: There were considerable differ-
ences in mortgage offerings in terms of interest rates and maturity across
the case countries. The market shares of various interest rates varied across
economies around 2009. Australia, Ireland, Korea, and Spain adopted the
standard adjustable-rate mortgage, under which the rate was set by the
lenders at their discretion and might vary across borrowers. Short and
medium-term fixed-rate mortgages were the dominant instrument in
Canada, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. These instruments were rollover
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Item Date Year-on-year increase Growth Rate of year-on-year increase
Balance of RMB deposits 109.10 11.4 -4.2
Balance of bank loans 74.91 13.9 -0.2
Balance of real estate loans 15.42 18.8 -0.3
Balance of individual mortgage loans 10.29 20.1 -0.9
Table 3 – Statistical report on the loans of financial institutes: Q1 2014 (trillion yuan, %)
Source: Zhongguo renmin yinhang (Central Bank of the PRC), “2014 nian yi jidu jinrong jigou daikuan touxiang tongji baogao” (Statistical Report on the Loans of Financial Insti-
tutions: Q1 2014), 2014, www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2806335/index.html (accessed on 29 November 2015).
Bank
2012 2013 2012 2013
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 13.66 13.12 14.51 10.17
Agricultural Bank of China 12.61 11.86 19.00 14.52
Bank of China 13.63 12.46 11.67 12.35
China Construction Bank 14.32 13.34 14.26 11.12
Bank of Communication China 14.07 12.08 15.05 6.82
Table 4 – Growth rates of capital adequacy ratio and business profits of state-owned commercial banks (%)
Capital Adequacy Ratio Business Profit
Note: According to Wikipedia, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is the ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk. National regulators track a bank’s CAR to ensure that it can absorb a
reasonable amount of loss and that it complies with statutory capital requirements. 
Source: Zhongguo renmin yinhang (Central Bank of the PRC), “2013 nian di yi jidu Zhongguo huobi zhengce zhixing baogao” (Report of Chinese Monetary Policy Performance: Q1
2013), www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/125991/2892009/index.html; “2014 nian di yi jidu Zhongguo huobi zhengce zhixing baogao” (Report of Chinese
Monetary Policy Performance: Q1 2014), p.14, www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/125988/2806502/index.html (both accessed on 29 November 2015).
or renegotiable rate loans in which the rate was typically fixed for a period
of up to five years with a longer amortisation period. Fixed mortgage inter-
est rates of over five years were rare, except for mortgages in Germany,
which could be fixed for up to 15 years with a 30-year amortisation. France
was the only European country dominated by fixed-rate mortgages. The
mortgage market in the United States was unusual because of the preva-
lence of long-term fixed-rate mortgages with interest rates fixed for 30
years. 
Typical maturity in the eurozone before the GFC was 20 to 30 years. (19)
Longer maturity products existed in several countries, with up to 50 years
in Spain and France and up to 60 years in Finland, although with low market
shares. At an extreme, Switzerland had 100-year (inter-generational) mort-
gages. As in China, the maximum maturity was often linked to retirement
age. 
Prepayment penalty: While China does not apply the prepayment
penalty, many countries used penalties to compensate the lender for lost
interest over the remaining term of the fixed rate (see Table 6). Prepayment
penalties on fixed-rate mortgages were not allowed in many states in
United States. Even in states that allowed them, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac historically did not enforce such penalties. Prepayment penalties were
sometimes restricted to certain conditions, for instance, in Germany if the
borrower was moving out or if the lender refused a request to increase the
mortgage. (20)
Mortgage default rates: As shown in Table 1, China has a low mortgage
default rate. While many countries saw greater house price volatility com-
pared with the United States, households faced lower levels of negative eq-
uity and lower default rates than their counterparts in the United States. (21)
Delinquencies on securitised loans in many countries increased, but re-
mained well below those in the United States. Spain and the United King-
dom also saw a substantial increase in mortgage defaults during the crisis,
but to a much lesser extent than in the United States. In the United States,
housing defaults reached their highest level since the 1930s, and 11.1 mil-
lion residential properties (23.1% of the total) had negative equity mort-
gages in 2010. (22)
Funding sources for mortgages: Banks in many countries play a major
role in originating mortgage loans, and their financing resources differ sub-
stantially across countries. The bank can swap its short-term deposits for
medium maturity fixed-rate liabilities; it can issue medium-term fixed-rate
debt by covered bond, a securitisation scheme in which bonds backed by
selected mortgages pooled by lenders are sold to investors through the sec-
ondary market (bond market); and mortgage securitisation is an alternative
in which securities backed by selected mortgages pooled by lenders are sold
to investors through the secondary market (securities market).  The biggest
difference between covered bonds and mortgage-backed securities is that
while mortgage-backed securities are off the issuer’s balance sheet once
sold, covered bonds remain obligations of the issuer (often a bank), and the
assets remain on the issuer’s  balance sheet (usually with an appropriate
capital charge); in essence, the investor has recourse against the issuer and
the collateral. In many countries deposits were the fundamental sources for
mortgages, and the role of covered bonds and MBS were still limited. (23)
Many European countries favoured the covered bond to finance mortgages,
and the outstanding value of mortgage-covered bonds in the eurozone rose
by almost 80% between 2003 and 2007. (24) Covered bonds accounted for
more than half of the residential loans in Spain and Sweden in 2008. Den-
mark was notable, with covered bonds accounting for 100% of residential
loans outstanding. 
The United States securitised more than 60% of mortgages to govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises or the market. Compared to covered bonds,
mortgage securitisation had a cost advantage due to smaller capital re-
quirements.  Also, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was unhappy
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1998 2013
Real estate investment 361.42 8,601.30
% of total fixed asset investment 12.72 19.24
% of GDP 4.28 15.12
Housing investment 208.16 5,895.10
% of total real estate investment 57.60 68.5
Balance of real estate loans 310.62 14,600.0
% of total bank loans 3.6 21.0
Balance of individual mortgage loans 42.62 9,800.0
% of total real estate loans 13.72 61.64
% of GDP 0.5 17.2
Table 5 – The development of the primary mortgage market in China (billion yuan, %)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, China Statistical Press, 1999 and 2014; Zhongguo renmin yinhang (Central Bank of the PRC), “2014 nian jinrong jigou daikuan touxiang tongji
baogao” (Statistical Report on the Loans of Financial Institutions 2014), 2015, www.pbc.gov.cn/diaochatongjisi/116219/116225/2810329/index.html (accessed on 29 November 2015).
about the use of covered bonds as they create a class of claimants in liq-
uidation. The presence of the government-backed secondary mortgage
market institutions that lowered the price of such mortgages enabled the
dominance of the fixed rate long-term mortgage loans in the United States.
These securities did provide higher-than-normal yields when the housing
market continued to climb. However, when housing prices started to drop
around 2007, elevated default rates among subprime mortgage loans trig-
gered the credit crunch through losses on these securities in the global fi-
nancial markets, and dramatically reduced liquidity in the system. Moreover,
compared with covered bonds, mortgage securitisation had a cost advan-
tage due to smaller capital requirements. (25) The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) was also unhappy with the use of covered bonds as they
create a class of claimants in liquidation. (26) The presence of government-
backed secondary mortgage market institutions that lowered the price of
such mortgages enabled the dominance of fixed rate long-term mortgage
loans in the United States. These securities provided higher-than-normal
yields while the housing market continued to climb, but when housing
prices began to drop around 2007, elevated default rates among subprime
mortgage loans triggered the credit crunch through losses on these securi-
ties in the global financial markets, and dramatically reduced liquidity in
the system. (27)
Degree of government involvement in the mortgage
market
Unlike government intervention via administrative measures and mone-
tary policies in China, government involvement in the market economies
mainly included state-owned financial institutions that originated mortgage
loans and state-sponsored housing finance agencies that provided liquidity
facilities for the mortgage markets, along with homeownership promotion
for the poor and disadvantaged, and the improvement of the legal frame-
work for the mortgage market. 
Housing finance agencies: There were significant differences among coun-
tries in the presence of government support for mortgage markets, mainly
including insurance guarantees of mortgages, guarantees of securitised
mortgages, and institutional support via government-sponsored entities.
Canada and the Netherlands had government-backed mortgage insurance
programs. The German Development Bank provided mortgage subsidies to
commercial banks for purchases of energy-efficient housing and other so-
cially desirable purposes (e.g., homes for the elderly). However, no European
countries provided all three pillars offered in the United States. The market
share of mortgages backed by government entities in the United States was
larger than that in any European advanced economies. (28)
Homeownership promotion: In the mid-1950s, the homeownership rate
in the United States had already reached 60%, higher than that in many
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Country Amount Applicability Penalty Free Payment
Denmark Yield maintenance
Short-term fixed: loans 
with non-callable bonds
Germany
Interest margin damage 
and reinvestment loss
All fixed rate; no penalty on adjustable rate;
maximum 10 year
No penalty if property sold 
Spain




Maximum 10% per year
France
Maximum 6 months interest or 
3% of outstanding balance
Adjustable or fixed rate 
No fee in case of unemployment, death, 
or job change
Netherlands Yield maintenance Fixed rate 
10% per year, hardship or relocation 
with no penalty
UK 2-5% of amount repaid
Discounts and fixed rate; in contrast 
roughly 3 monthly payments
Canada Higher of lost interest or 3 months Lender may waive for own customer Up to 20% per year
Australia Change in cost of funds Discounts and fixed rates; in contact 
US Up to 5%; more typically 3% Adjustable rate 20%
Switzerland Yield maintenance Fixed rate 
Table 6 – Prepayment penalties in selected countries
Source: Michael Lea, “International Comparison of Mortgage Product Offerings,” Research Institute for Housing America, 2010, www.housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publica-
tions/74023_10122_Research_RIHA_Lea_Report.pdf (accessed on 30 December 2014).
European countries, e.g., 33% for France, 13% for Germany, 26% for Swe-
den, and 43% for the United Kingdom. (29) In 2008, the homeownership rate
in the United States was similar to the rates of many European countries. (30)
This is noteworthy, as these European countries provided far less govern-
ment support for homeownership than the United States did. For instance,
while some European countries provided full or partial deduction of mort-
gage interest payments, particularly for owner-occupied housing, the United
States provided very beneficial tax treatment and allowed full tax de-
ductibility for the payment of mortgage interest. This implies that there is
no positive relation between homeownership rates and the degree of gov-
ernment involvement. High homeownership in China is largely the result of
the privatisation of welfare housing rather than of the wealth accumulation
or government support as seen in the case countries. Nevertheless, the Chi-
nese government has given the ownership market priority over the rental
market since the termination of wealth housing provision in 1998, as the
former brings huge amounts of fiscal income from taxes on housing trans-
actions and land sales.
Supervisory and regulatory structures: The key determinants of the mar-
ket depth of mortgage finance in advanced economies are collateral and
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Austria Banks and saving banks Mainly 7.0 3.1 Fixed 80
Belgium Banks Mainly 29.9 Fixed 100
Canada





1.0 31.0 Mixed 80 (95)
Denmark Mortgage and retails banks 114.7 0.1 Mixed 80
France Mortgage and retails banks Mainly (banks) 22.5 1.8 Fixed 100
Germany Banks and saving banks 19.0 1.8 Fixed 80
Ireland Bank and building societies and mortgage brokers Mainly (banks) 15.6 29.6 Variable 100+
Italy Banks Mainly 2.1 30.8 Mixed 80
Netherlands Banks and mortgage banks and brokers Mainly 3.6 30.8 Fixed 125
Portugal Banks 14.5 27.3 Variable 90
Spain





45.6 24.1 Variable 100
Sweden Bank and mortgage institutions 
Some, plus
covered bonds
53.7 0.3 Variable 80-95
UK Bank and building societies and mortgage brokers Mainly 14.0 31.2 Variable 110
US Banks and mortgage brokers
Mainly
securitisation
0.1 64.1 Fixed 100+
China Banks Largely Variable 80
Table 7 – Housing finance systems in selected countries around 2008 and China in 2014 
Mortgage Funding Mortgage Loan Features   
* There is a complete waiver in certain circumstances, for instance, if the property is sold (Germany), hardship or relocation of the borrower (Netherlands), or the borrower is
unemployed (France).
Source: compiled by the author, data source: IMF, “Global Financial Stability Report 2011,” www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2011/01 (accessed on 30 December 2014);
Michael Lea, “International Comparison of Mortgage Product Offerings,” Research Institute for Housing America, 2010,
www.housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publications/74023_10122_Research_RIHA_Lea_Report.pdf (accessed on 30 December 2014); China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, China
Statistical Press, 2014.
bankruptcy laws that define the legal rights of borrowers and lenders. (31) A
well-functioning regulatory system is necessary to ensure the transparency
of information on financing costs and housing transactions, helping apprais-
ers value house purchases for interested parties and allowing lenders to
gauge default probabilities and track the value of their collateral. (32) While
European countries had stringent oversight and banks maintained mortgages
on their balance sheets, underwriters in the United States relied on govern-
ment standards with simple screening tools that lacked means to evaluate
the likelihood of repayment, then sold mortgages to government-sponsored
enterprises and had no further interest in the mortgage after sale. Most Eu-
ropean countries had a single financial sector regulator who oversaw the
banking and capital markets, but the United States had a relatively frag-
mented regulatory structure, with mortgage lenders regulated by multiple
authorities depending on the type of financial institution. Liberal regulation
in the United States with respect to new financial innovations, especially de-
rivatives, resulted in a high degree of mortgage securitisation. This indicates
that a well-functioning legal and regulatory framework is crucial, particularly
for a viable mortgage securitisation market, e.g., functioning bankruptcy laws,
clarity as to mortgage loan transfer procedures, and reliable issuer-investor
dispute resolution mechanisms. In China, however, such frameworks for the
newly emerged mortgage market are still under construction.  
Correlations between the mortgage market, housing
prices, and economic stability
Housing price movements paralleled the size of mortgage markets in
many advanced economies before and around the GFC. Relaxing lending
standards in good times drives up house prices, while a tightening of stan-
dards puts downward pressure on house prices. (33) Many advanced
economies witnessed strong growth in mortgage loans along with their un-
precedented run-up in housing prices before the crisis. (34) By 2009, many
countries had already recorded large mortgage markets, and the ratio of
mortgage debt to GDP in 2009 was 82%, 82%, and 85% in Sweden, the
United States, and the United Kingdom respectively. Notably, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Switzerland recorded ratios of over 100%. (35) Higher loan-
to-value ratios were associated with higher housing prices and mortgage
growth. For example, the required down payment on subprime mortgages
in the United States was 2.7% in 2006 as housing prices peaked. (36) During
the GFC, counties with higher mortgage indebtedness (e.g., United King-
dom, United States, Netherlands, Ireland) recorded more serious declines
in housing prices than those with lower indebtedness (e.g., France, Germany,
Austria). (37)
Housing booms and busts directly affect the overall economy. The recent
experiences in the United States, Spain, Ireland, and to a lesser extent the
United Kingdom provide fresh examples of unsustainable housing booms
that have turned into busts, with sizable out-put losses and crises in the
banking sector and overall economy in some cases. (38) The GFC is not an
exceptional case. Reinhart and Rogoff show that the six major historical
episodes of banking crises in advanced economies since the mid-1970s were
associated with housing busts. (39) This pattern can also be found in the
emerging markets: for instance, the magnitude of housing price declines in
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Although pre-crisis and in the early stage of the crisis, housing price move-
ments were intimately linked with the size of the mortgage market, and
housing busts were associated with economic stress, there was no positive
correlation between the size of mortgage markets and overall economic
stability.While Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS) were under
the most economic stress in the GFC, there was substantial variation in the
size of their mortgage markets. They were very small in Greece and Italy,
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Maximum six months interest 
or 3% of outstanding balance
41 58
20-30
Interest margin damage and 




30 Yield maintenance on fixed rate 107 56
25-35 66 75
30
2.5% up to yield maintenance 




25 2-5% of amount repaid 85 66
30 Up to 5% on ARMs only 81 67
20-30 17 82
              
  Mortgage Loan Features
average in Spain and Portugal, and large in Ireland (35%, 23%, 64%, 66%,
and 87% respectively). (40)
The relationship also applies to China. Relaxing lending standards, as part of
the stimulus package in 2008 initiated by the government to cope with the
GFC, resulted in a big housing boom around 2010. Credit restrictions imposed
in 2011 greatly constrained housing transactions in the next couple of years.
The recent housing downturn in 2014 was mainly a result of the capital short-
age in the banking system. As housing served as a pillar industry since the end
of the 1990s, fluctuations in the housing market inevitably affected overall
economic growth. The overall rise in the housing sector in the 1990s and 2000s
made a huge contribution to prosperous economic growth; the downturn in
the housing market in 2014 was a main reason for declining GDP in 2014. 
Overall, the mortgage markets in the selected economies and in China differ
considerably along a number of dimensions (see Table 7). The Chinese mortgage
market is relatively underdeveloped, largely because of the rudimentary de-
velopment of the housing and financial sectors during its market transition.
While housing finance in many economies focused on the consumption side,
most of the real estate investment in China flowed to the supply sector in the
1990s, and it was not until the 2000s that China saw rapid growth in the mort-
gage market. Nevertheless, the size of the mortgage market today is still much
smaller than in the case countries. Although fixed-interest-rate mortgages are
popular in some countries, they are rare in China. China’s central bank has man-
aged to maintain a standard of minimum loan-to-value of 80%, which helped
avoid the phenomenon of underwater residential mortgages (41) in China during
the market downturn. Many advanced economies have integrated the mort-
gage sector into the capital market and have developed instruments to fund
mortgages (e.g., covered bonds or MBS). However, a secondary market is not
found in China. The mortgage markets in both the market economies and in
China have seen a positive relationship between housing price movements
and the size of mortgage market and between housing price movements and
economic stability; however, there is no direct correlation between the size of
the mortgage market and overall economy stability. 
Government involvement in the mortgage sector is seen in both the mar-
ket economies and China, but in different forms and degrees. The nature of
housing necessitates a government role in mitigating or correcting undesir-
able market outcomes. Government involvement does not necessarily guar-
antee a stable housing market, however. The United States, a country with
deep government involvement in the housing finance sector, experienced
steep housing price declines during the crisis. Although its strong government
involvement provided access to affordable mortgage financing, there is lim-
ited evidence that it boosted homeownership, made the system more effi-
cient, or provided buffers against economic stress, and it might have
exacerbated the amplitude of the recent boom-bust cycle. (42) Ellis also claims
that interest rate deductibility, combined with the lack of prepayment penal-
ties, contributed to the growth of mortgage indebtedness in the United
States. (43) China has recorded deep government involvement in the mortgage
market but in a different form (administrative measures and monetary poli-
cies). The five state-owned banks under strict supervision of the central bank
dominate the mortgage market, reflecting a legacy of administrative controls
and market mechanisms in the housing finance sector. This has led to an im-
balanced housing structure between the ownership and rental sectors, and
between public and social tenures. In contrast, the German government fo-
cused more on balanced housing development in the rental vs. ownership
market. Consequently, its market proved more resilient in the GFC. The im-
plication is that government involvement in the housing and mortgage sec-
tors is necessary; the form of government involvement is more crucial for a
sustainable housing finance system. 
Lessons for the development of mortgage
finance in China
This paper has answered the three questions raised in Section 1. First, the
paper shows that downturns in the housing markets in some advanced coun-
tries around 2008 and in China in 2014 all derived from the financial sector
but with different roots. The over-securitisation of mortgages in the United
States accounted most for its housing decline and subsequent economic
stress; however, the housing downturn in China is largely a result of the un-
derdeveloped housing finance sector. While the IMF suggests that the secu-
ritisations of financial products aimed at spreading risk in the United States
must return to basics, (44) one of the most promising remedies for the problem
of housing price decline in China is to further develop the housing finance
sector through more product offerings and capital access alternatives for the
housing and banking sectors. Moreover, the lesson from the PIIGS is that
problems in a small mortgage market can also result in national economic
stress. In this regard, it is wrong to think that China’s small mortgage market
will not threaten the financial and even the overall economy. 
Second, the international experiences imply the significance of regulatory
and legal frameworks for a well-functioning mortgage market. Following
the famous slogan of “crossing the river by touching the stones underneath,”
China has adopted a trial-first approach in some phased reforms in the eco-
nomic transition over the past decades, in which regulatory and legal frame-
works are developed based on the experiences generated from the trials.
However, this approach might not be applicable to the mortgage finance
sector, which is significant for not only the economic sector, but also for
the lives of individual citizens. Mortgage systems need to be supported by
explicit legal institutions and instruments and to be developed in a manner
that enhances economic efficiency while ensuring a sense of social fairness.
In the absence of a well-functioning legal system and mature primary mort-
gage market, it is too early to develop a secondary mortgage market. China
needs to make more effort to improve diversity in the primary market be-
fore establishing a secondary market. 
Third, housing in market economies by its nature inevitably has two types
of demand, namely shelter and investment. In the United States, housing
was treated as a financial derivative manipulated by elites or financial
whizzes, and triggered the GFC around 2008. In China, housing development
has been an engine to sustain economic growth since the end 1990s; how-
ever, this has led to imbalances between the public and private sectors (45)
and ownership given priority over rental tenure. This paper indicates that
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homeownership promotion does not guarantee a stable housing market;
for sustainable socio-economic development, housing should be treated as
neither an economic engine as in China nor a financial derivative as in the
United States. While many scholars today claim that housing should return
to its basic as shelter in the United States, balancing the demand for housing
as shelter and investment remains a major issue for China in its market
transition. 
It should be noted that the Western experiences provide a useful but
limited reference for China. Housing finance brings together complex and
multi-sectoral issues that are driven by constantly changing local features,
such as a country’s legal environment or culture, economic makeup, reg-
ulatory environment, and political system. (46) While economy tends to be
global, the factors of politics and society are localised. There is no one
ideal mortgage instrument for a market; a robust mortgage market will
have several different instruments that can be tailored to the varying
needs of market players in different regions. China has a very different
background from the market economies in terms of its political regime,
governance ideology, economic status, and cultural and philosophical
standpoints. Its strong government involvement in the socialist regime
indicates that politic factors matter in the mortgage sector and that the
housing and banking systems are not responsive to market incentives
alone. This fundamental divergence implies that China should not adopt
finance innovations developed in the Western systems wholesale; it needs
to develop its own model for the development of the mortgage market
based on the international experiences and its unique background.
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